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El THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UONNITA TUOM, Widow of 
Uaniel ~uom, 
Petitioner, Case No. 19162 
vs. 
DUANE HALL TRUCKING, STATE 
INSURANCE FUND and INDUSTRIAL 
COM11ISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
\·/rit of Review from the Industrial Co!!lll\ission 
of the State of Utah 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
~his is a review of a final order of the Industrial Col!ll1\ission 
of Utah denying petitioner death benefits under Utah's Worker's 
Compensation Laws. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
On March 2, 1983, the Administrative Law Judge entered 
'"c11d1nqs of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying petitioner's 
11 ·1t1on (R. 144). From petitioner's Objections to the Findings 
1 1ct, Conclusions of Law and Order, Motion to Review and/or Motion 
""C<rns1der (R. 146-148), the Industrial Col'lffiission affirmed the 
Order of the Administrative Law Judge bj' a Denial of Motion fr:ir 
Review (R. 153). Plaintiff thereafter filed a Pctit1on for Writ 
of Review (R. 155-157) and a \vrit of Rl" ievJ i:osu(·d (P. 158) br1ny1• 
this matter before the Supreme Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants on appeal respectfully ask that the decision 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Daniel L. Tuom died on September 5, 1981, of multiple 
injuries sustained from a truck accident on August 26, 1981, in 
Coalville, Utah. ~he accident occurred during the course of the 
decedent's employment with responCl.en t Duane Hal 1 Trucking ComDany. 
Petitioner filed her claim for dependent benefits on 
March 12, 1982, alleging that she is the surviving and dependent 
spouse of decedent (R. 2). 
Petitioner entered into a common law marriage with 
Daniel Tuom in Idaho and lived with him from llay, 1971 until June, 
1980. No children were born as a result of the live-in arrangemen' 
(R. 142). 
In early 1978, Daniel Tuom met Arlene Browning, dated he' 
a few times in December 1979, and became more involved with her in 
the Spring of 1980 (R. 142). When petitioner became aware of the 
seriousness of Daniel Tuom's relationship with Arlene Browning, t>c 
petitioner voluntarily left her common-law husband in 0reoon on 
June 13, 1980 and returned to Idaho. In August, 1980, Dan1el ~,1c 
began spending several nights a week with Arlene Browning, an~ 
finally moved in with Ms. Browning and her two children on Dece~ 
1980 (R. 103-105, 142-143). Subseqentl~· Daniel and .lrlene, v:ith t"• 
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family, moved to Utah in March, 1981 (R. 96-97). After a period 
of no work (and a short-lived employment opportunity), Daniel 
\,ce,1an working for the respondent Duane '.lall Trucking in June, 1981 
IR. 96, 143). He continued to live with Arlene during this tine and 
up until his death. According to the oetitioner, Daniel Tuom visited 
her on three occassions between June 1980 and September 1981 (R. 57). 
The last of these visits supposedly was in March of 1981 (R. 57). 
Nevertheless, Arlene considered herself married to Daniel, and the 
Administrative Law Judge found that Daniel never returned to the 
petitioner (R. 143). 
Respondents disagree with one allegation made in the 
Statement of Facts. of petitioner's Brief. At pages 4 and 5, 
petitioner's counsel itemizes plaintiff's living expenses, and concludes: 
Mrs. Tuom's sister moved in with her to help 
offset household costs. At best, this would 
reduce her own (Petitioner's) requirements, 
but only as long as she relied upon the 
charity of her sister. (petitioner's Brief at 5). 
Petitioner's own testimony at the hearing before the Administrative 
Law Judge clearly indicates the petitioner did not rely on her sister 
for charity (R. 58). After petitioner left Daniel Tuom on June 13, 
1980, she immediately went to live with her mother (R. 51), 
and later moved in with her sister, with whom she continued to share 
an apartment at the time of the trial (R. 51). While petitioner lived 
with her sister, the living expenses were shared equally (R. 56). 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER IS NOT THE SURVIVING SPOUSE 
OF DECEDENT. 
Respondents do not refute the fact that petitioner and 
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conunon law marriage in Idaho. 
agrees "they did have a common law marr1nge ond . \·.'(' r1..-· nc-,'!• 
formally divorced" (R. 14 2) . 
evidence suggests this relat1onshi1• •.,;as co11tinu1nq at the t1mC' 
the deceased' s death of September 5, 19 81. 
Petitioner cites Schurler v. Industrial Commission, 43 r. 
696 (Utah 1935) as recognizing "the possibility that a common law 
marriage, consumated in a state where such marriages are valid, 
would in fact be valid in the State of Utah." (Pe ti ti oner's Brief ,. 
7). But Schurler's dicta certainly must have contemplated possiul" 
Utah recognition of such a marriage only if the couple continueo 
live together in Utah. Petitioner never lived with the rleceased 
Utah, and petitioner's own testimony indicates the deceased never 
contributed to petitioner's support while the deceased lived in[< 
with another woman (R. 42-43). 
Furthermore, Utah should not recognize a mar i ta 1 re 1 at ioc.: 
where the parties have shown by their actions that they wish to ·"~ ' 
their relationship in the same simple way they entered into c.t. 
apparent mutual consent. Petitioner quotes at length from Hiltcn _ 
Roylance, 69 PAC. 660 (Utah 1902) for the proposition that "no 
dissolution of the (marital) status can be effected simoly b" the 
mutual consent or agreement of the parties." !Petitioner's Brief 
Hilton concerned a marriage consummated unrler L'tah la\·1. 
do us part." n 
marriages, and could hardly ima(J i nE t ·1c · ,n; ! u J ,-1 r i 1-
arrangements. r'. :-:;,. 
marry once and stay together. ~h1:-;; t··:,(' ,~ ;'" r- 1 n 1 : l t:' 
-4-
·0nt,'rn;'L:ited in Hilton; however, ti!'les have changed. In 1900 the 
marriage rate in the United States was 9.3 per 1,000 as opposed to 
1 d1vorcc rate of .7 per 1,000; and in 1981, the same rates were 10.6 
,,·,i ~,. 3 respective!'/. See The World AlManac & Book of Facts, 1983 
1'lcwspaper Enterprise Association Inc., New York), page 955. Not only 
h~s the divorce rate increased over 750% the past 81 years, many people 
are now choosing common law marriages over the fanfair of formal 
marriages. Obvious reasons for the popularity of common law marriages 
include the following: 
1. They give the appearance of more independence for the 
2. Obligations between the parties are minimized, especially 
in light of the trend towards smaller families and the intention of 
common law marriage partners--as in the instant case (R. 143)-- not 
to have any children at all; 
3. They are indicitive of the increasing acceptance of 
extra marital relationships and emphasis on individual freedom in 
toda:;' s society. 
This court should follow cases Much more recent than 
~ilton, and allow the apparent mutual consent of the parties to 
terminate common law marriages not continued within Utah. In 
Farrow v. Hopkins, 453 SW 2d 785 (Tenn. 1970), a woman claiming to 
he the widow of an employee killed in an industrial accident was 
J1c111ed death benefits because the husband and wife were separated 
lcncr time and, although the parties saw each other occassionally, 
,i1scussed se!Jarat1on or reconciliation. The Tennessee 
111 ,·,,urt fnund that "(t)he deceased did not support the wife. 
- s-
She asked for no support nor expected any." Id. at 788. ~~1rnilar 
facts are found in the case at bar. And in Brezickyj v. Eastern 
Railroad Builders Inc., 59 A.O. 2d S78, 197 '.lYS 2r 452 (1977), th· 
New York Supreme Court, Appellant Division, denied death benefits 
the purported widow claimant, even after an involuntary separation, 
because the separation continued by apparent mutual consent. 
Likewise, plaintiff herein and the deceased mutually 
consented to continue their separation indefinitely. Petitioner 
purchased a home with her sister, which purchase the petitioner 
characterized as an investment (R. 56). And, in spite of his commcc. 
law marriage to petitioner, the deceased was uninhibited from 
exploring extra-marital relationships in 1978, 1979, and 1980. The 
deceased later entered into a live-in arrangement with Arlene 
Browning, and even took care of Arlene's children for several weeks 
while she was away (R. 143). The petitioner and the deceased filed 
separate federal tax returns beginning in 1980 (R. 53, 62) and the 
deceased took out accident insurance showing Arlene as his wife (R. 
128). All actions of the deceased and the petitioner showed they 
contemplated ending their common law marriage. 
II. PETITIONER IS NOT A DEPENDENT OF THE 
DECEDENT BY OPI:RATION OF LAW. 
The question of dependency of a surviving spouse under the 
Utah Worker's Compensation Act is controlled by Utah Code Annotat•c 
§ 35-1-71 which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
The following persons shall be presuned to be 
wholly dep0ndent for support upon a deceased 
employee: 
(2) For purposes of payments to be nade under 
subsection (2) (b) (i) of Section 35-1-68, 
a surviving husband or wife shall be 
presumed to be wholly dependent upon a 
spouse with whom he or she live at the time 
of the employee's death. 
1.C.A. §35-1-71 (2) (1953, as amended 1979). 
Petitioner charges it was manifest error of law for the 
Administrative Law Judge and the entire Commission not to give cause 
or effect to Section 35-1-68 (2) (b) (iv), which orovides in pertinent 
part: 
(b) (iv) For purposes of any dependency rletermination, 
a surviving spouse of a deceased employee shall be 
conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a 
six year period from the date of death of the employee. 
u.c.A. § 35-1-68 (2) (b) (iv) (1953, as amended 1979). 
But the dependency determination test in the above statute applies 
only to surviving spouses. In other words, before Section 35-1-68 
12) (b) (iv) can be applied to the facts of this case, it must be 
clearly shown that the petitioner is the surviving spouse of the 
deceased. According the to Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Utah Apex Mining Company v. Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 529, 44 PAC. 
656 (1926), where a claimant is living apart from the deceased at 
the time of the death, the claimant has the burden of proof to show 
this dependency. The Commission found that the deceased "provided 
no support for the petitioner nor was there any indication that he 
intended to provide any support for her since the time of his 
soµaration" (R. 144). Therefore, irrespective of the surviving 
5?ouse question, petitioner failed to carry her burden of dependency. 
Petitioner submits that "living with" standard imposed 
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by § 35-1-71 (2)' represents a duty or restraint upon 
her "freedom of action" under Basin_I~ Ser'lic~'- y_._P~~_ic Scr·.~ 1 
Commission, 531 P.2d 1303, 1305 (lltc>h 197'>1, and thcrpfor<~, 'i ])-)-
should apply because it is "more consistent with a liberal constrJ_ 
of the Worker's Compensation Act. (See Petitioner's Brief at 
Two points refute petitioner's broad interpretation of the above 
authorities. First, Basin was narrowly written to apply to the 
Public Service Commission, which has no inherent regulatory powers 
except "those which are expressly granted. Id. Pe ti ti oner 
herein is not being restricted from any action, nor is she being 
given an additional duty by applicantion of § 35-1-71 (2) instead 
§ 35-1-68. Rather, she is simply being made to prove she was 
dependent upon the deceased because the relationship existing betwe~ 
the two at the time of the fatal accident is, at best, unclear. 
Second, a liberal construction of the \lorker' s CoMpensa ti on Act siw,_ 
not overlook the fact that "(t) he concept of marriage under \·lorker'; 
Compensation Statutes is not special. but follows the ordinary domeo:. 
relations law" of each State. Gamez v. Industrial Col'"\ffiission, 114 
Arizona 179, 181, 559 P.2d 1094, 1096 (1977), citing 2 Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law, § 62.21 (1976). 
If, as petitioner argues, an inconsistency exists betwee~ 
subsections 71(2) and 68, res,-iondents agree Jucicial construction,.-
give greater weight to the more recent and more specific pronounc'-'-
of the legislature. Osuala v. Aetna Life and Casualty, ~ns P.~~ 
(Utah 1980); 
§§ 4703, 5201, 5204 (3rd Edition 19431. :::_;uch construct iun fa''' 
§ 35-1-71 (2), not subsection 68. Subsection 71{~) ~as ~~endeJ 
-s-
1979, as was subsection 68; therefore, the more specific pronouncement 
between the two should prevail. Subsection 71(2) goes beyond 68 
by requ1r1ng cohabitation, and thus it is the most specific. In this 
Jct1on, Commission properly overlooked the dependency presumption aff-
orded spouses under subsection 68 because subsection 71(2) was intended 
to qualify application of the former statute. In other words, no 
spousal dependency presumption can apply, under Utah law, unless the 
petitioner is living with the employee at the time of the employee's 
death or the surrounding circumstances indicate some consistent 
economic dependency by the claimant on the deceased. Where it is 
unclear who the deceased employee was married to at the time of his 
death, as here where the actions of the parties contradict the self-
serving testimony of the claimant (or even question whether the 
deceased was legally married at all), justice and fairness demand a 
look at actual dependancy. Otherwise, as stated in Brezickyj, supra, 
"(t}o find the claimant herein eligible for death benefits is to 
provide support for her, which decedent had not done" for over 
fourteen months. 59 A.O. 2d at 580, 397 NYS 2d and 454. If the 
deceased employee had maintained relationships with several people, 
and each of them claimed death benefits, it could be very confusing for 
the Court to determine which is the real spouse without first examining 
all the circumstances surrounding each relationship. 
Utah Supreme Court decisions have uniforrnally deterrnined 
S['ousa l dependency questions in light of all surrounding circumstances. 
''"" such circumstance is whether the claiming spouse was living with the 
,,,,, J,,'/c'e at the time of the accident. For example, in Roller Coaster 
'''1['Jn~' v. Industrial Commission, 112 Utah 532, 189 P.2d 709 (1948), 
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the Utah Supreme Court said depencency must be determined from all 
circumstances, including the amount of any support being received 3 -
the time of the fatal injury. Tlnd in Cor1h1ned ~\,'tals HPrluction c 
Industrial Commission, 74 Utah 247, 254, 279 P 1019, 1021 (1929), 
the court set for th a test for compensation, to be determined from J_ 
of the evidence: "(I)t must be made to appear as a fact that they 
were dependent upon (the employee) at the time (the employee) was fa· 
injured." In Apex Mining, Supra, the following outstanding facts wee. 
deemed controlling: 
First, that the parties were living separate and 
apart for a considerable period of time; second, 
that the husband during that period made no 
contributions whatsoever towards the support of 
his wife; and third, that the wife was able to 
and did support herself. 
Id. at 535, 244 PAC. at 659. 
These facts are present in the instant matter. Petitioner 
and the deceased had been living separate and apart for over 14 moo~• 
prior to the death. No evidence suggests the petitioner relied 
on or ever received any significant or even partial support from the 
deceased since the June 1980 separation. At all times during the 
deceased's absence, petitioner was able to and did support herself. 
Indeed, petitioner continues to provide for her own support, and is 
uninhibited from doing so. 
concluded: 
Id. 
On similar facts, the Utah Supreme Court in Apex Mining 
The natural presumption from these facts is against 
dependency. Of course that presumption might be 
overcome by proof explaining the separation and non-
support as temporary, and indicating a mutual purpose 
and intent to live together again and be supported b· 
the husband. But here the explainat1on indicates the 
very contrary. 
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Similarly, petitioner here should be required to overcome 
a presumption against dependency because no evidence suggests that 
she would ever have joined the deceased after she left him, or that 
she could have reasonably expected any support thereafter. In the 
alternative, if Apex Mining is no longer controlling, petitioner at 
least should be required to show actual dependency. Utah authorities 
are in agreement that dependency is a question of fact for the 
Commission to decide. Thus the Commission's decision, like a jury's 
verdict, is conclusive as to the facts unless no substantial evidence 
supports the judgment. The Commission's uncontroverted findings that 
the petitioner was not living with the deceased at the time of the 
accident, and that the petitioner was not in any way dependent upon 
the deceased, lends substantial support for the Commission's conclusions. 
The Administrative Court was justified in examining 
dependency because certainly no proven marriage between petitioner 
and the deceased existed at the time of the fatal accident. 
Even though common law marriages are not recognized as 
spousal relationships in Utah (Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-2(3)) (1953 as 
amended 1977)), the Administrative Law Judge looked to Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-71(2) to determine if the relationship that existed 
between the petitioner and the deceased could by itself afford 
dependancy status to the applicant. The Industrial Col".lI!lission was 
bending over backwards to avoid simply dismissing the petioner's 
claim for lack of any spousal relationship, which they could have 
,Jone based upon strong Utah Case law (see Schurler v. Industrial 
',,nm11ss1on, supra,), persuasive public policy and the aforementioned 
,~ :t1cJn 30-1-2 (3), all of which oppose any recognition of a marriage 
-11-
between petitioner and the clccr>asecl ,n !lt:.1[;. t:u!" 111 1n (:ffnrt 1 
give the petitioner ever 'l l '' rt 11n l t-
Commission examined the liv111': arrJn\11-'I:ll nt:J ,-1f the pct Ltioner clnr:J 
the deceased at the time of the accident. c>n lj' when the 
petitioner was found to be living apart from the deceased, 
and the deceased found to be living with another woman, did the 
Commission deny benefits. 
III. PETITIONER WAS llOT CONSTRUCTIVELY 
"LIVING WITH" DECEDENT AT THI: DATE OF DEATH. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has given liberal constr~· 
to the meaning of the phrase "living with" in Section 35-1-71(2) '' 
Diaz v. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 77, 13 I'.2d 307, "311 119321, 
the liberality ends where the wife no longer looks to the husband f:· 
support. Since petitioner no longer looked to the deceased for her 
support and had not "become a public charge" in the absence of his 
financial assistance. Even a liberal construction of "living with" 
still defeats the peitioner's claim. Id, 13 P. 2d at 313. 
Petitioner cites Ranger Insurance Company v. Industrial 
Commission, 115 Ariz. A[Jp 45, 485 P.2d 69 (1971), as granting 
death benefits to a wife even though the wife and husband were 
separated, if the separation is due to the husband's misconduct. 
In Ranger Insurance Co., however, the wife attempted to return tc 
her husband but was threatened with death by the husband's new 
companion if she ever saw her husband aqain. 
to rejoin him. In fact, [Jetitioner testified the deceased call 
more than she called hir'.l ('\. 41). 
-12-
l 11n lc.-i r i l:_·. I»·t ltioner made no effort to return to the deceased 
111'1 r3rel· SfJ"k .. ::e to him, if at all. These facts show an apparent 
it i 1d 11 nment of the relationship. Based on Brezickyj and Farrow, 
;u11~.1, petitioner should be denied benefits not only because she 
was not constructively living with the deceased at the time of 
death but also because the separation continued by mutual consent. 
IV. PETITIONER WAS NOT ACTUALLY DEPENDENT 
ON DECEDENT AT THE TIME OF DEATH. 
The Administrative Law Judge found that the decedent "provided 
no support for the applicant, nor was there any indication that he 
intended to provide any support for her since the time of her 
separation" (R. 143-144). Petitioner states in her brief that for 
the Administrative Judge to have found the above, he must have 
arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded her testimony at trial. 
(Petitioner's Brief at 17) Petitioner testified that her depencency 
on the deceased was genuine because the decedent gave her $350.00 after 
she left him, $250.00 of which was for replacing the top of 
petitioner's car (R. 41-42). Even if this testimony was believed, 
by the Administrative Judge, receiving $100.00 for the necessities 
of life over 14 months cannot possibly afford dependency status to 
petitioner. And in light of petitioner's self serving testimony on 
the subject, reasonable minds will certainly agree with the Admin-
1strative Judge that there was no indication that deceased intended 
i" [Jrovide any support for petitioner. 
In Ranqer Insurance Co. v. Industrial Conmission, supra, 
"· 1 zona llppe l lant Court said the Industrial CoMI!lission alone may 
1 ·~·n;ane whether a witnesses testimony will impact upon the findings 
fact: 
!Tille determination of the credibility to be accorded 
testimony . is the type of determination 
-13-
routinely made by the Commission, and an 
ultimate finding of fact based upon such a 
credibility determination cannot be challenged. 
Id. 485 P.2d at 871. 
The Utah Supreme Court is in agreement that only on v~r 
rare occassions should the Commission's findings be overruled. Ir 
Harrison v. Industrial Commission, 578 P. 2d 510, 511 (Utah 1978), 
this court stated that it is "for the Industrial Commission to weigc. 1 
the evidence before it and to determine the facts of the case." 
The Harrison court added: "Our statute (35-1-85) provides that the 
findings of fact by the Commission are final and shall not be 
subject to review." Id. at 512. More recent authority is found in 
Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Manfredi, 631 P. 2d 888, 890 (Utah 1981), 
as follows: 
(T)he reviewing court's inquiry is whether the 
Commission's findings are "arbirary and capricious" 
or "wholly without cause" or contrary to the "one 
(inevitable) conclusion from the evidence" or 
without "any substantial evidence to support them." 
Only then should the Commission's findings be 
displaced. (Bracketed language in original). 
No substantial testimony or evidence refutes the Commissi: 
findings in this case. Unlike McGarry v. Industrial Commission, 62 
Utah 81, 222 PAC. 592, 594 (1923), (cited in Petitioner's Brief), 
petitioner was in no way deperdent upon the deceased. No evidence 
suggests that petitioner's life style changed at all following the 
death of her former common law husband. Petitioner states that tr.E 
deceased was earning $700.00 per week, and therefore, he would ha 
been required to pay alimony in the event of a rlivorce. 
has no basis, in light of the deceased's fluctuat-1ny an•' c;,•is•·•• 
employment and the proven ability of the oet1t1oner to bear h~r 
living expenses. At all times after her leavin0 the deceased, 
- ] .J-
the ~et1tioner's living expenses were apportioned between her and 
~ither her mother or sister (R. 51). For these reasons, and in 
light of all evidence, the Commission's finding that petitioner was 
not deµendent upon the deceased is correct. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents respectfully submit that the Industrial 
Commission properly found that the decedent provided no support to 
the petitioner since the date of their separation. Petitioner 
never attempted to return to the decedent and, by her actions and 
those of the deceased, the separation continued by a mutual consent. 
The weight of evidence indicates at all times subsequent to 
separation, petitioner and the deceased held themselves out as no 
longer being married. Therefore, petitioner was not the surviving 
spouse of the deceased at the time of death. Accordingly, the 
Commission's order denying death benefits to the petitioner should 
be affirmed. 
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